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STORIES OF RIGHTS: DEVELOPING MORAL
THEORY AND TEACHING LAW
Patricia A. Cain*
Jean C. Love**
RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, & RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY.

By

Judith Jarvis Thomson. Edited by William Parent. Cambridge,Mass.:
Harvard University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 260. $12.95.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judith Jarvis Thomson is a teacher of philosophy and we are law
school teachers. As teachers in different but related disciplines, we
share a common pedagogical approach: use of the case method. In
law, our cases are stories of real-life struggles with real-life resolutions.
But in the law school classroom, the creative teacher will often push
beyond the real life story. In Socratic fashion, the law school teacher
will pose a series of hypotheticals to test the students' understanding
of the case. Often the law school teacher prepares for class by searching for the perfectly framed hypothetical. Judith Jarvis Thomson is
the quintessential expert at creating the perfectly framed hypothetical.
Her most well-known hypothetical is "The Famous Violinist." It is
intended to pose the problem of abortion in a differentlight. She asks
you to imagine this:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed
with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has
been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you
alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped
you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into
yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood
as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, "Look,
we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you - we would
never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the
violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him.
But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you." Is it
morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? [pp. 2-3]

A Defense of Abortion,the first essay in Rights, Restitution, & Risk,
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begins with this story of the famous violinist. The reader will at once
see the many ways in which a person's being plugged to the famous
violinist is like and unlike a pregnant woman's being plugged to her
unborn child.
And if "The Famous Violinist" does not capture your imagination,
then consider the case of people-seeds which "drift about in the air like
pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root
in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up
your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy" (p.
12). But, as sometimes happens, one of your screens is defective and
so a seed drifts through and takes root in your living room. Does it
have the right to stay?
Welcome to the world of Judith Jarvis Thomson, a world inhabited
by famous violinists, people-seeds, and just plain ordinary folk like Alfred and Bert. Alfred pours cleaning fluid into his wife's coffee (wishing her dead, of course), whereas Bert merely stands by and watches
his wife mistakenly pour cleaning fluid into her own coffee (wishing
her dead, of course). Does Alfred do a thing that is worse than what
Bert does? Is killing worse than letting die? (p. 78).
William Parent, the editor of Rights, Restitution, & Risk, is to be
commended for collecting Thompson's essays on moral theory,
thereby making them available in a single volume. His choice was to
organize the essays by topic, rather than chronologically. Most of the
essays are about "rights." Thomson's concept of "rights" is something that has developed over time. Thus, the reader may find it helpful to note the dates of original publication of these essays by referring
to the list of sources at the end of the book.
Thomson is fascinated with the meaning of the "right to life," a
fascination she readily admits (p. 22). She is also intrigued by the
meaning of property rights (pp. 49-77). In her afterword, she suggests
that, when confronted with a puzzling concept, one should ask for its
cash value. Thus she poses the question: "What is the cash value of
having a right?" (p. 252). Throughout the book, Thomson makes repeated connections between rights to life and property and the legal
entitlement to compensation for a violation or infringement of those
rights. It is her emphasis on this connection between rights and the
cash value of rights that appears to have given rise to the book's title.
What the title does not capture is the fact that this collection of
essays is really a collection of stories. Yet this may be the most important feature of Thomson's writing. As she explains in the afterword:
The readerof these essays will see that I regardexamples,stories,
cases- whetheractualor invented- as of centralimportanceto moral
theory.... Thereare two reasonsfor thinkingthem of centralimportance. In the firstplace, we do not even know what acceptingthis or
that candidatemoralprinciplewouldcommitus to until we see what it
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tells us aboutwhatpeopleoughtor oughtnot do in this or that (so far as
possible)concretelydescribedset of circumstances.
Second,and more interesting,it is preciselyour moral views about
examples,stories,and cases which constitutethe data for moral theorizing. [p. 257]
Examples, stories, and cases are the tools of both the law school
teacher' and the moral theorist. Thomson, as moral theorist, provides
us with tools that work especially well in two of the law school courses
that we are currently teaching. Those courses are torts and feminist
legal theory. In the next two sections, we will present our separate
thoughts on the richness that Thomson's stories can add to these
courses. In the concluding section, we will warn of the risk of stripping stories of their context - a risk that may be shared by the moral
theorist and the law professor.
II.

A.

TORTS2

Rights and Wrongs

In the afterword to Rights, Restitution, & Risk, Thomson asserts
that "[c]ontact with law has been immensely enriching to moral theory in recent years" (p. 257). Why? Because the purpose of moral
theory is to examine human action, and to explain "what makes those
acts right which are right, and what makes those acts wrong which are
wrong" (p. 256).
Although one might expect moral theory to be simple, Professor
Thomson emphasizes that one of the central messages of her essays is
"precisely that a moral theory adequate to its explanatoryjob is going
to have to be a more complex affair than we might have expected it to
be" (p. 255). When she wants to remind herself of the complexity and
variety of human responses to a moral problem, she turns to the literature of the law. By her account, casebooks are "anthologies of short
stories, each of which ends in a moral problem" (p. 256). She values
cases both for their facts and for the judges' arguments in support of
their decisions (p. 256).
As a torts professor, I was delighted to discover that many of Professor Thomson's essays are based on classic tort cases that appear in
the standard casebooks.3 After reading and rereadingRights, Restitu1. See, e.g., Robertson, The Legal Philosophyof Leon Green, 56 TEXASL. REV. 393, 422-23
(1978). Robertson notes:
A case may comprehend all the important processes of government much as a single drop of
water mirrors a universe, or the life of a single human being has within itself the history of
mankind....
. . If the student gains the power to read a case ... he [or she] inevitably becomes a
critic and thereby develops his [or her] creative power.
Id. at 422-23.
2. Professor Love wrote this section.
3. For example, Some Ruminations on Rights, p. 48, and Rights and Compensation,p. 66, are
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tion, & Risk, I becameconvincedthat contactwith ProfessorThomson's essayscould be immenselyenrichingto the teachingof tort law.
In this section,I aim to makeProfessorThomson'sessaysmoreaccessible to torts professorsby summarizingseveralof them, and discussing how these essaysmightbe incorporatedinto a typicallaw school
classroomdiscussion.
As a moraltheorist,ProfessorThomsonis particularlyinterested
in the subjectof rights (p. 251). Severalof her essays considerthe
question:"Whathaveyougot whenyou'vegot a right?"(p. 251). She
believesthat this questionmustbe resolvedbeforewe can respondin a
reasonedway to anotherquestion: "[W]hatrights[do] we have?"(p.
251). Tortsprofessors,of course,are extremelyconcernedaboutboth
questions. It is true that the term "tort"is usuallydefinedas a "civil
wrong."4It is also truethat somepeople"thinkof the law of [t]ortsas
the law of wrongs."5Nevertheless,torts "mightbetterbe said to be a
law for the creationand protectionof rights."6In ProfessorSeavey's
words,the "function[of tort law] has continuouslybeen to markout
new areasfor the protectionof humaninterests."7Tort law enforces
rights throughawardsof damagesor equitablerelief for legal harms
sufferedas the resultof anotherperson'sbreachof a duty whichis the
correlativeof a right.8 Sincetort law dealswith rightsand duties,the
conceptof a rightand its functionin the legal decisionmakingprocess
is of greatsignificanceto torts professors.
ProfessorThomsonis fascinatedby the questionof whetherrights
are absolute,and if not, whatit meansto have a right. In considering
thesequestions,she drawsextensivelyon the intentionaltort literature
involvingthe privilegesof self-defenseand necessity.
B. Self-Defense
In her essay Self-Defense and Rights (p. 33), Professor Thomson

examinesthe "rightto life," which presumablyincludes"the rightto
not be killed"(p. 33). If Aggressorhas a right to life, she wants to
based on the classic private necessity cases. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn.
456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908). Remarks on Causation and Liability, p. 192, is based on two classic cases regarding causation and multiple defendants. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,26
Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
& KEETONONTORTS? 1, at 2
4. W. KEETON,D. DOBBS,R. KEETON,D. OWEN,PROSSER
& KEETON].
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafterPROSSER
ON TORTS5 (1954).
5. W. SEAVEY,COGITATIONS
6. Id.
7. Id. Professor Seavey goes on to say that to speak of torts as the law of wrongs is to
misconceive its function. Instead, it "should be regarded as a body of rules which provide compensation for harm caused by another." Id. at 6.
C. KRAUSE& A.
& KEETON,supra note 4, ? 1, at 2; 1 S. SPEISER,
8. See generally PROSSER
GANS, THE AMERICANLAW OF TORTS?? 1.8-1.9 (1983); Coval & Smith, Rights, Goals, and
Hard Cases, 1 LAW & PHIL.451, 451-52 (1982).
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know "[p]recisely why [it is] permissible for Victim to use [an] antitank gun on Aggressor" when Aggressor is driving a tank toward victim with the intent of killing Victim (p. 33). As a way of considering
this question, she evaluates the three alternative explanations that are
typically put forward to justify the privilege of self-defense.
The first explanation she calls "forfeit" (p. 33). Under this theory,
Aggressor has forfeited his right to life by attacking Victim. Thomson
finds this theory totally unsatisfactory because it suggests that Victim
could shoot Aggressor even if Aggressor's tank stalled and Aggressor
got out to examine the engine, falling and breaking both ankles (pp.
33-34).
The second explanation she calls "specification," including both
moral and factual specification (p. 37). Friends of specification say
that having a right to life doesn't include having a general right to not
be killed. Instead, having a right to life includes having a right to not
be killed under specified circumstances (p. 37). Moral specification
says that having a right to life includes having a right to not be killed
wrongly or unjustly (p. 37). Factual specification says that having a
right to life includes having a right to not be killed only under certain
circumstances (p. 38). For example, "all you have is a right to not be
killed if you are not in [the] process of trying to kill a person, where
that person has every reason to believe he can preserve his life only by
killing you" (p. 38).
Thomson used to be a friend of moral specification (p. 37). However, she has now abandoned this justification for the privilege of selfdefense. She offers the following clear and witty explanation of her
dissatisfaction with moral specification:
ConsiderVictim. We were asked to explainwhy it is permissiblefor
Victimto use his anti-tankgun on Aggressor,therebykillinghim; and
considerthe followinganswer: "The reasonwhy it is permissiblefor
Victimto kill Aggressoris that Aggressorhas no rightto not be killedhe only has a rightto not be killedwronglyor unjustly- and in killing
Aggressor,Victimwouldnot be killingAggressorwronglyor unjustly."
One does not mind all circles,but this circle is too small. [p. 37.]
Thomson is even less enamored of the factual specification theory (p.
38). It, too, leads to circular reasoning, because the friend of factual
specification has "to figure out when it is permissible to kill, and then
tailor, accordingly, his account of what right it is which is the most we
have in respect of life" (p. 39).
The third explanation for the privilege of self-defense Thomson
calls "overriding" (p. 42). Unlike the first two explanations, which
assume that all rights are absolute, the "overriding"theory recognizes
that some rights, including the right to life, are nonabsolute (p. 42).
An overriderthen says: "[T]he reason why it is permissible for Victim
to kill Aggressor is the fact that, the circumstances being what they
are, Aggressor's right to not be killed is overridden" (p. 42). By what
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is Aggressor's right to life overridden? By the "utility" of Victim's
action or by Victim's "more stringent right" to kill a person who is
currently giving Victim every reason to believe that he will kill Victim
unless Victim kills him (pp. 43-46). But Thomson is not convinced
that the benefits of Victim's conduct would always outweigh the costs
(p. 43). Nor is she satisfied that there is any principled way in which
to determine when Victim's rights are more stringent than Aggressor's
(pp. 43-47), particularly if both of them claim a "natural right," that
is, "a right a human being has simply by virtue of being a human
being" (p. 44).
In short, none of the above three typical explanations for the privilege of self-defense withstand Thomson's scrutiny. She has demonstrated that we don't know what it means to have a "right to life" in a
case in which the defendant claims the privilege of self-defense. Even
Thomson is surprised at the outcome of her analysis:
I do not for a momentthinkit a novel idea that we standin need of an
accountof just how an appealto a rightmay be thoughtto functionin
ethical discussion. What strikesme as of interest,however,is that the
need for such an accountshows itself even in a case which might have
been thoughtto be transparent.[p. 48.]
Assigning or summarizing Professor Thomson's essay could
greatly enrich a classroom discussion of the law of self-defense. Most
students take it for granted that there is both a right to life and a
privilege of self-defense.9 Thomson's essay will force students to think
more carefully about the tension between the two principles. It also
will create a springboard for a discussion of other possible explanations for the law of self-defense. For example, Dean Prosser takes the
position that the "privilege of self-defense rests upon the necessity of
permitting a person who is attacked to take reasonablesteps to prevent
harm to himself or herself, where there is no time to resort to the
law."'0 And Dean Kadish suggests that the privilege of self-defense
derives from "the right of every person to the law's protection against
the deadly threats of others."1' He asserts that if this right is to have
any content, it must "include maintenance of a legal liberty to resist
deadly threats by all necessary means, including killing the
aggressor."12
9. In fact, early common law courts (applying principles of strict liability) did not recognize a
privilege of self-defense. A slayer who killed in self-defense "deserves, but needs a pardon" in
order to avoid a death sentence. 1 F. HARPER,F. JAMES& 0. GREY,THE LAW OF TORTS
? 3.11 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafterHARPER& JAMES];C. MORRIS& C. MORRIS,JR., MORRISON
TORTS 33 (1980); PROSSER& KEETON, supra note 4, ? 19, at 124. Not until approximately 1400
was the privilege of self-defense recognized by the law of crimes and the law of torts. Id.
& KEETON,supra note 4, ? 19, at 124.
10. PROSSER
11. Kadish, Respectfor Life and Regardfor Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF.L. REV.
871, 884 (1976).
12. Id. at 884-85. For more general discussions of the law of self-defense and the distinction
between justification and excuse, see Dressier, Justificationsand Excuses: A Brief Review of the
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Professor Thomson does not offer her own explanation of the privilege of self-defense. Unlike torts professors, she is less concerned
about the law of self-defense and more concerned about what it means
to have a right. From her perspective, it is enough that she has proved
that the right to life is not absolute (p. 40).
C. Private and Public Necessity
In her next two essays, Some Ruminations on Rights (p. 49) and
Rights and Compensation (p. 66), Thomson explores more fully the
question of whether rights are absolute. She recognizes that there are
two good reasons for preferringto say that rights are inviolable. First
of all, "assertions of rights have a kind of moral force that no other
moral assertions do"; "rights are trumps" (p. 254). Second, a moral
theory which regards rights as absolute is simpler than one which does
not (p. 254). Although she thinks that these are two good reasons for
preferringa moral theory that rights are inviolable, she does not think
these reasons are good enough because, in fact, very few rights are
truly absolute (p. 255). A moral theory which does not allow for the
infringement of rights cannot "explain the moral phenomena which
need explaining as well as one which does" (p. 255). To prove her
point, Professor Thomson turns to the law regarding the defense of
private necessity.13
Suppose, she says, that you are on a backpacking trip in the high
mountain country when a blizzard strikes with such ferocity that your
life is imperiled (p. 66). May you trespass on private land, smash in
the window of an unoccupied cabin, help yourself to the food supply,
and burn the wooden furniturein the fireplaceto keep warm? Yes, she
says, it is morally and legally permissible for you to do all of these
things (pp. 66, 68). Therefore, it is inaccurate to say that the owner of
the cabin has an "absolute" right in either the real or the personal
property (pp. 55-57).
On the other hand, it would also be inaccurate to say that the cabin
owner has "no right" in the property because the law does requirethat
you compensate the cabin owner for the loss of the window, food, and
wooden furniture.14 To explain what needs explaining here, Thomson
Conceptsand the Literature, 33 WAYNEL. REV. 1155 (1987); Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985); Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justificationsfrom Excuses,
49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS.89 (Summer 1986); Greenawalt, The PerplexingBordersof Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM.L. REV. 1897 (1984); Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the
Program of the Criminal Law, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.PROBS.109 (Summer 1986).
13. For a summary of the law of private necessity, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OFTORTS
& KEETON,supra note
?? 197, 263 (1965); 1 HARPER& JAMES,supra note 9, at ? 1.22; PROSSER
4, at ? 24; Bohlen, Incomplete Privilegeto Inflict Intentional Invasionsof Interestsof Propertyand
Personality, 39 HARV.L. REV. 307 (1926).
14. See pp. 40-41, 54, 59, and 253 for Thomson's references to similar fact situations in
which compensation would be allowed. Thomson recognizes that full compensation is appropriate in the hypothetical under discussion because you exercised the privilege of private necessity to
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distinguishes between violating a right and infringing a right. You infringe a right whenever you interfere with a right; you violate a right
only if you infringe it by acting unjustly or wrongly (pp. 40, 51 & n.3).
In the case of the cabin owner, you would be infringing some of the
cabin owner's property rights, but you would not be violating any of
them (p. 54).
Moral theorists will continue to debate what it means to have a
right, and whether rights are absolute. Furthermore, they will challenge Judith Jarvis Thomson's assertion that the concept of "infringement of a right" is the "only adequate explanation" for the legal
operation of the incomplete defense of private necessity (pp. 253-54).
Professor Jules Coleman, for example, takes the position that the privilege of private necessity may be explained equally well by a "more
general principle of justice" whereby you must pay compensation to
the cabin owner for "wrongfully interferingwith a legitimate interest,"
even though you did not violate any "right" of the cabin owner's.15
Nevertheless, it seems to me that Thomson's distinction between
an "infringement of a right" and a "violation of a right" is useful to
torts professors. It helps to explain much of the law regarding private
necessity. For example, it helps to explain why the cabin owner may
not eject the trespasser(i.e., the trespasserhas not violated the owner's
real property rights).'6 It also facilitates a student's understanding of
why the cabin owner may not obtain nominal damages in an action for
trespass to land (no "violation"),17but may recover compensatory
damages in an action for trespass to chattels (no "violation," but
"infringement").18

Professor Thomson's analysis of the law of private necessity contains other hypotheticals that will carry the classroom discussion beyond the cases in the standard torts casebooks. For example, she
poses the following fact situation:
There is a child who will die if he is not given some drug in the near
future. The only bit of that drugwhich can be obtainedfor him in the
nearfutureis yours. You areout of town,andhencecannotbe askedfor
protect your own life. She suggests that if you had exercised the privilege to protect a third
party's life or property, however, you might owe the cabin owner less than the full cost of the
harm done (p. 54). For a discussion of the latter situation, see text accompanying notes 19-22
infra.
15. Coleman, Moral Theoriesof Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 2 LAW & PHIL. 5,
20-21 (1983) (emphasis in original).
16. See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF
TORTS? 197, comment k (1965).
17. See, e.g., Polebitzke v. John Week Lumber Co., 173 Wis. 509, 510, 181 N.W. 730, 732
(1921) (trespass to land action against defendant who entered plaintiff's land to remove his logs
that had floated downstream) ("Nominal damages are awarded because a party has sustained an
& KEETON,supra
invasion of his rights. Here the plaintiffs'rights were not invaded.");PROSSER
note 4, ? 24, at 147-48.
&
18. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); PROSSER
KEETON, supra note 4, ? 24, at 147-48.
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consentwithinthe availabletime. You keepyoursupplyof the drugin a
lockedbox on your back porch. [pp. 51-52]
If we break into your box, remove the drug, and feed it to the child, we
can claim the privilege of private necessity,19but we will have to compensate you for the value of the medicine.20 In Some Ruminations on
Rights, Thomson questions the propriety of this legal remedy (pp. 6465). She suggests that, instead of putting the entire burden of meeting
the child's need on us, the law should provide that we share the burden with you (p. 65). If she is correct about this, she says "it follows
that we need not reimburse you for the entire cost of repairing or replacing the box and replacing the drug, but only such part of that cost
as leaves you to pay the same amount as each of the rest of us" (p. 65).
Thomson's hypothetical can be used to encourage the student to
think more carefully about the differencebetween a case in which the
defendant invokes the privilege of private necessity to protect his or
her own life or property21and the case in which the defendant invokes
the privilege of private necessity to protect the life or property of another.22 In the first case, it is appropriate to expect the defendant to
reimburse the plaintiff fully for the harm done to the plaintiff's property. In the second case, it may be more appropriate to expect the
plaintiff to share with the defendant the cost of protecting the life or
property of another threatened by an emergency.
A torts professor might then modify Thomson's hypothetical to
create a fact situation that raises the defense of public necessity.23 For
example, there is a city filled with children who will die if they are not
given your drug in the near future. You have a very large quantity of
the drug in your garage. We break into your garage, remove the drug,
and feed it to the children. Because the law allows us to claim the
complete privilege of public necessity, rather than the incomplete privilege of private necessity, we are not liable to you for the cost of the
drug that we have taken. The law places the entire burden of meeting
the children's needs on you.
Students almost certainly will be shocked at this outcome. The
hypothetical will enable the torts professor to discuss the reasons for
treating the defense of public necessity as a complete defense.24 It will
19. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OFTORTS? 263(1) (1965).
20. Id. at ? 263(2) & comment e.
21. Id. at ?? 197(1)(a), 263(1).
22. Id. at ?? 197(1)(b), 263(1).
23. Id. at ?? 196, 262; 1 HARPER& JAMES,supra note 9, at ? 1.16; PROSSER
& KEETON,
supra note 4, ? 24, at 146-147; Hall & Wigmore, Compensationfor PropertyDestroyedto Stop the
Spread of a Conflagration, 1 ILL.L. REV. 501 (1907); Reynolds, Is "PublicNecessity"Necessary?,
29 OKLA.L. REV. 861 (1976).
24. Dean Prosser explains that public necessity is a complete defense so that the "champion
of the public" won't have "to pay for the general salvation out of his [or her] own pocket."
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 4, ? 24, at 146. Professor Reynolds observes that there are
"three reasons for some continued degree of protection from liability for destruction of property
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also provide a vehicle for considering whether the law would operate
more fairly if it provided a mechanism for us to share the burden of
meeting the children's needs with you. That should lead into a discussion of whether it would be even fairer to spread the cost of supplying
the drug over all the families of the children who benefited from it, or
over all of the citizens of the community.25 Such a discussion would
leave students with a much clearer understanding of the policy considerations behind the law of public and private necessity than can be
gleaned by reading Ploof v. Putnam,26 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.,27 and Surocco v. Geary.28
There is another way in which Judith Jarvis Thomson's essays can
enrich classroom consideration of the law governing public and private necessity. Most torts casebooks do not include fact situations in
which the defendant inflicts death or personal injury in order to save
someone's person against an outside threat of harm.29 A torts professor who wants to explore the application of the privileges of public and
private necessity to such fact situations should turn to Thomson's essays entitled Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem (p. 78) and
The Trolley Problem (p. 94). The core hypothetical in these two essays
asks whether it is permissible for Edward to kill in the following case:
Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. On the
track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will
not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off
to the right, and Edward can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately,
there is one person on the right-hand track. Edward can turn the trolley,
killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five.
[pp. 80-81]
Students will need some background information before entering
into a discussion of The Trolley Problem. The professor should first
pose a derivative hypothetical designed to elicit a discussion of the law
in the face of public calamity": (1) "[T]here is a need for swift action in the face of an impending
disaster"; (2) There is a "need to offer protection to public employees"; and (3) There is a "need
for special power in wartime." Reynolds, supra note 23, at 875-79.
25. Professor Reynolds argues that the "community should respond with compensation for
what has been destroyed," perhaps by preparing a plan for "emergency taxation" that would
spread the pecuniary loss. Reynolds, supra note 23, at 879-81. Professors Hall and Wigmore
take the position that the "sacrificedparty" should be entitled "to be reimbursed,by the community or portion thereof, to the amount of his [or her] compulsory sacrifice,less the ratableproportion which would fall upon him [or her] as a member of the community or portion thereof." Hall
& Wigmore, supra note 23, at 514-15 (emphasis omitted). See also PROSSER& KEETON, supra
note 4, ? 24, at 147.
26. 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908).
27. 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
28. 3 Cal. 69 (1853).
29. No torts casebook asks whether it would be appropriateto inflict death or personal injury
in order to save someone's property, presumably because it is "reasonablyclear that one would
not have even an incomplete privilege to kill an innocent person to save property." PROSSER&
KEETON, supra note 4, ? 24, at 148.

May 1988]

Stories of Rights

1375

of private necessity. Assume that Edward turns the trolley toward the
one. Further assume that, by some miracle, the trolley stops a few feet
before it hits the one. Edward gets out. As he steps onto the track in
front of the trolley, he looks up and sees a boulder tumbling down the
steep bank, coming directly at him. Edward knows that he would be
killed or seriously injured if the boulder were to strike him on the
head. Behind him is the trolley; on each side of him is a steep bank;
ahead of him is the one. Edward runs forward, pushing the one to the
ground so that Edward can get out of the way of the falling boulder.
The boulder hits the ground between the trolley and the one. The one
sustains minor cuts and bruises (as a result of being pushed to the
ground); Edward escapes unscathed. In an action by the one against
Edward for battery, may Edward invoke the privilege of private necessity? And if so, must Edward nevertheless compensate the one for his
cuts and bruises on the theory that private necessity is an incomplete
privilege?
The application of the privilege of private necessity to actions for
death or personal injury "has received very little consideration."30
Nevertheless, Professor Fleming speculates that a person in Edward's
position could invoke the privilege of private necessity: "It could be
... that one who is threatened with very serious injury may subject an
innocent stranger to slight harm, disproportionatelysmaller than any
from which he is himself trying to escape."31 Professor Bohlen is of
the opinion that, if the privilege of private necessity is to be recognized
in such circumstances, it should be characterized as an incomplete
privilege.32 Thus Edward would have to compensate the one for "infringing" his right not to be personally injured, even though Edward
did not "violate" any rights of the one because Edward's conduct was
"justified"under the circumstances.
After the class has analyzed the derivative hypothetical, the professor should emphasize that Edward would be entitled to invoke the
privilege of private necessity only if he inflicted relatively slight harm.
Edward could not inflict upon the one "an injury equal, or closely
approximate, to that with which he [was] threatened, no matter how
impossible it [might have been] for him to otherwise escape the

threatened injury."33

Returning now to The Trolley Problem, Thomson says, "I do not
suppose that if the trolley driver turns off to the right, killing the one,
then he must pay compensation to the one's heirs" (p. 41). Furthermore, she suggests that the result would be no different if the trolley
driver fainted and a bystander threw a switch that turned the brakeless
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
J. FLEMING,THE LAW OFTORTS89 (6th ed. 1983).
Bohlen, supra note 13, at 321.
Id. at 319-20 n.18; accord J. FLEMING,supra note 31, at 89.
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trolley toward the one (p. 96). Why not? Because the law should treat
this as a case governed by the complete defense of public necessity?34
What if there had been fewer than five people on the track ahead? At
some point does this become a case governed by the incomplete privilege of private necessity, with damages payable to the survivors of the
one?35 Is it appropriate for tort law to recognize the privileges of public and private necessity at all when human life is at stake?36 And
regardless of how a student would answer the above questions, would
the student's answers be different if Edward were a transplant surgeon,
and he killed a healthy patient in order to obtain five organs to be
transplanted into the bodies of five sick patients?37
These are difficult questions indeed.38 Professor Thomson suggests
that both the bystander at the switch and the transplant surgeon
would "infringe" the one's "right to life" in the above hypotheticals
(p. 106). She then searches for some difference between the cases that
would explain why most people think that the bystander may throw
the switch, but the transplant surgeon may not operate (p. 106). She
concludes that the bystander at the switch is to be distinguished from
the transplant surgeon by the following two crucial facts: (1) the bystander at the switch saves his five by making something that threatens
them threaten only the one, and (2) the bystander at the switch does
not do that by means which themselves constitute infringements of
any of the one's rights (pp. 106-07). By contrast, the five patients are
threatened by organ failure, and it is not that threat which the surgeon
transfers to the one healthy patient (p. 107). Moreover, the surgeon
who would save the five sick patients by killing the healthy one must
34. Professor Bohlen suggests that the privilege of public necessity should be recognized
when personal interests are invaded "for the purpose of protecting the public interest or of protecting others as well as the actor." Bohlen, supra note 13, at 323. In such cases, he takes the
position that the privilege should be complete because "the actor should not be required to pay
for his privilege by bearing a loss from which he derives no personal advantage, or from which he
gets only a small part of the advantage." Id.
35. Public necessity is a defense that may be invoked when a danger "affects ... so many
people that the public interest is involved," but "[t]he number of persons who must be endan&
gered in order to create a public necessity has not been determined by the courts." PROSSER
KEETON, supra note 4, ? 24, at 146. Any case of necessity that does not qualify as a public
necessity is a case of private necessity. If this case were classified as one governed by the privilege
of private necessity, it would be analogous to the hypothetical in which we broke into your
locked box to obtain the drug that would save the life of the sick child. See text accompanying
notes 19-22 supra. In other words, it would be a case of private necessity in which the defendant
acted to save others, rather than the defendant's own self.
36. Professor Fleming says: "What little authority there is seems to deny such a privilege, at
any rate if it would involve serious bodily harm or death." J. FLEMING, supra note 31, at 89.
37. Pp. 80, 95. For a discussion of this hypothetical, see Kadish, supra note 11, at 890. See
also D'Amato, The Speluncean Explorers- FurtherProceedings,32 STAN. L. REV.467, 469-75,
481-85 (1980).
38. For an excellent jurisprudentialdiscussion of these questions in the criminal law context,
see the fictional "Case of the Speluncean Explorers," in which four men who were trapped in a
cave killed a fifth man and ate him in order to survive until they were rescued. Fuller, The Case
of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949); see also D'Amato, supra note 37.
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infringe the one's most stringent right to his body organs.39
Although these distinctions may satisfy a moral theorist that the
bystander may throw the switch, killing the one in order to save the
five, courts of law might not recognize a privilege of necessity under
such circumstances. Criminal courts traditionally have been reluctant
to recognize a privilege of either public or private necessity in cases of
murder or manslaughter, although the defendant's motive has been
considered in mitigation of the punishment for the crime committed.40
By contrast, the Model Penal Code section 3.02 provides that conduct
believed to be necessary to avoid some harm is justifiable if "the harm
or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged."41 The
Model Penal Code commentaries suggest that the defense of necessity
is available if a person intentionally kills one person in order to save
two or more.42
Tort law can be expected to follow the criminal law of a given
jurisdiction.43 Thus, if the criminal law does not recognize a privilege
of necessity, it can be expected that tort law will not allow the bystander to invoke a privilege of necessity either. The bystander then
would be obligated to pay wrongful death damages to the one's heirs
- an outcome that is contrary to Thomson's proposed resolution of
the case (p. 41). On the other hand, if a jurisdiction follows the Model
Penal Code, the civil courts probably would recognize the privilege of
necessity.44 Most likely, the civil courts would characterize the defense as a privilege of public necessity, thereby exonerating the bystander from the payment of survival and wrongful death damages
altogether.45 Of course, if the defense were characterizedas an incomplete privilege of private necessity, then the bystander would be re39. Professor Laycock, in a critique of The Trolley Problem, says that the "distinction between diverting an existing threat and creating a new one has no explanatory power whatever for
me." Laycock, The Ultimate Unity of Rights and Utilities, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 407, 409 (1985).
On the other hand, Laycock is surprised that Thomson does not put a greater emphasis on the
fact that the transplant surgeon would infringe the healthy donor's "strongest imaginable entitlement to his own body organs." Id. at 408. After all, it was Thomson who wrote in A Defense of
Abortion: "My own view is that if a human being has any just, prior claim to anything at all, he
has a just, prior claim to his own body" (p. 8).
40. W. LAFAVE& A. SCOTT,CRIMINALLAW ? 5.4, at 445 (2d ed. 1986).
41. MODEL PENAL CODE ? 3.02 (1980). For a discussion of the Model Penal Code provision, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 40, at 442-43.
42. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 40, at 444.
43. Professor Bohlen said: "If the exigency in which [the victim's] slayers were placed was
not sufficient to relieve them from criminal punishment for his murder, a fortiori it would not
relieve them from liability to pay compensation under a death statute for the benefit of his dependents." Bohlen, supra note 13, at 320 n.18.
44. PROSSER& KEETON, supra note 4, ? 24, at 148.
45. See note 34 supra. The professor may want to explore the possibility of shifting at least a
part of the loss from the one's heirs to the five workers or to the community at large. See text
accompanying note 25 supra.
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quired to pay damages to the survivors of the one.46
What does it mean to say that the one has a right to life? Is the
right to life absolute or contingent? Is there a difference between a
moral theorist's answer to that question and a lawyer's answer?
Should tort law be informed by moral theory? Should moral theory
take into account the decisions made by judges in hard cases? These
are some of the interesting questions posed by a juxtaposition of moral
theory and tort law. Thomson's memorable stories in Rights, Restitution, & Risk both provoke and facilitate consideration of these fascinating questions.
III.

FEMINIST

LEGAL THEORY47

A. Building Theory in the Classroom
Several years ago, mostly in the early 1970s, some law schools began offering courses on "Women and the Law." In many instances
these courses were the direct result of student demand. Often, it was
the women students who put the course materials together, before
finding some cooperative professor to "teach" the course. These
courses were viewed as important for the women students, because
women's experiences and women's concerns had been left out of many
traditional law school courses. The founding of these "Women and
the Law" courses is often credited with planting the seeds for the subsequent flowering of feminist legal theory or feminist jurisprudence
courses. These "Women and the Law" courses, like women's studies
courses in other disciplines, offered the unique opportunity to view
many unrelated fields of law from a single perspective, the woman's
perspective. And that, of course, told us a lot about the position of
women vis-a-vis the law.
I teach my feminist legal theory class with a view towards giving
my students an opportunity to explore how different legal theories
might be used to improve women's status vis-a-vis the law. I expect
my students to build their own theories. Theories require a certain
amount of abstraction, and yet I am a firm believer that too much
abstraction is bad. The theories must be built from the ground up. By
that I mean we have to begin with specific cases, both real and hypothetical. I also rely heavily on personal stories volunteered by my
students.48

Judith Jarvis Thomson's essays on abortion49and privacy50 are
46. See note 35 supra.
47. Professor Cain wrote this section.
48. See Cain, TeachingFeminist Legal Theoryat Texas: Listening to Differencesand Making
Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming).
49. A Defense of Abortion, pp. 1-19.
50. The Right to Privacy, pp. 117-34.
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helpful in asking students to build theory. Her stories are not real
stories about real people and so one should not build theory from her
stories alone. But her stories are concrete and her people more real
than that abstract group of people behind the veil in the "original
position."51
In addition, Thomson's attempts to explain the differing responses
to her trolley driver and transplant surgeon problems52have helped
me to explore with my students such abstract notions as "rights" and
"responsibilities"and "autonomy" and "connection." In this section,
I provide a brief overview of some of the ways in which Thomson's
essays can be used to add concreteness to the search for theory. I also
question Thomson's emphasis on "rights" to the exclusion of "connectedness" and "relationship."
B. Abortion
A Defense of Abortion (p. 1) was written in 1971, two years before
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Roe v. Wade.53 It is a
very narrowly focused essay, intended to poke a hole in the moral argument that abortion is always wrong because it is an act of murder.
That argument, says Thomson, is usually attacked by contending that
the fetus is not a person. Thomson assumes, for purposes of discussion, that the fetus is a person. But the fetus, like the famous violinist,54 does not have an absolute right to life. Thus, abortion, even if
viewed as killing a person, is sometimes morally permissible. Specifically, Thomson argues that abortion is permissible to save the life of
the mother (by analogy to self-defense),55in the case of rape (by analogy to lack of consent), and when carrying the child to term would
require the mother to be a Good Samaritan,as opposed to a Minimally
Decent Samaritan (by analogy to the law governing the duty to rescue). That abortion is sometimes morally permissible is a sufficiently
strong premise for her purposes. The premise implies, of course, that
abortion is not always morally permissible.
Modern-day feminists might find her premise, because it is so narrow, not to their liking. Others may argue that her premise is irrelevant to the real issue in the abortion debate. The real issue is: Who is
it who is to decide when abortion is morally permissibleand when it is
not?56 Other feminists may even disagree with the structure of her
51. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

52. The TrolleyProblem, pp. 94-116. For a full statement of these hypotheticals, see section
II.C supra.
53. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. For a full statement of "The Famous Violinist" hypothetical, see section I supra.
55. For a discussion of Thomson's views on self-defense, see section II.B supra.
56. Professor MacKinnon says with respect to debates over the moral rightness of abortion:
"My stance is that the abortion choice must be legally available and must be women's, but not
because the fetus is not a form of life. In the usual argument, the abortion decision is made
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argument, claiming that it is antifeminist because it is not womancentered. As Professor Catharine MacKinnon comments:
Thus, for instance,JudithJarvisThomson'sargumentthat an abductedwomanhad no obligationto be a celebratedviolinist'slife support system meant that women have no obligationto supporta fetus.
The parallelseemsmisframed.No womanwho needsan abortion- no
woman,period- is valued,no potentiala woman'slife might hold is
cherished,like a gender-neutralfamous violinist'sunencumberedpossibilities. The problemsof genderare thus underlinedhere ratherthan
solved,or even addressed.57
These critiques are understandable, but, in my opinion, they are
not fair to Thomson's purpose. Remember, it was 1971 when this essay was penned. She pushed the moral debate forward by assuming
for purposes of discussion that the fetus was a person with its own
"right to life." She then argued from a woman's perspectivethat abortion is sometimes morally permissible.58 And although she may not
have cherished the pregnant woman to Professor MacKinnon's satisfaction, she tells a story that has valuable explanatory potential for
nonpregnant persons.
"Imagine being pregnant," I say to my students. Most students,
notably the men, have little experientialdata to support this imaginary
experience. To some, pregnancy is mystical. It is something intimately personal and, thus, not often discussed in public. Some students immediately distance themselves from the project. But now try
this: "Imagine that you wake up one morning back to back in bed,
connected to an unconscious famous violinist." The hypothetical is
stripped of all the personal history, of all the complications that one
might bring to the reality of pregnancy.
This "stripping"is both good and bad. It is bad because reality is
where we live and where we make our moral (and legal) choices. It is
good because transcendence of the intimately personal is necessary to
enable our real conversations with others about moral choice. Thomson understands the importance of talking about concrete cases when
one is developing moral theory (pp. 257-60). But she does not acknowledge the potentially differentuses of real and hypothetical cases.
As a teacher of feminist theory, committed to the reality of women's
experiences, I must be ever cautious in stripping too much of reality
from discussions of abortion. I find the story of "The Famous Violincontingent on whether the fetus is a form of life. I cannot follow that. Why should women not
make life or death decisions?" C. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED
94 (1987) (emphasis in
original).
57. Id. at 98-99 (footnote omitted).
58. Professor Robin West, in urging the development of a woman-centered "reconstructive
jurisprudence,"observes that "[firom a subjective, female point of view, an abortion is an act of
self defense, (not the exercise of 'a right of privacy') ...." West, Jurisprudenceand gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 69 (1988).
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ist" valuable, but it must be accompanied by other stories, real stories,
stories of women in physical pain, stories of fear, stories of
humiliation.59
Thomson's essay on abortion plays another important role in developing feminist legal theory. Consider the story of the Good Samaritan, who "went out of his way, at some cost to himself, to help one in
need of it" (p. 15). Now consider what a pregnant woman is being
asked to do on behalf of the fetus. Certainly it is more than even the
Good Samaritandid. He merely crossed the road to help a dying man.
The Good Samaritan bound the injured man's wounds and took him
to an inn, but he did not stay with him for anything close to nine
months, nor did he risk physical pain or injury in giving aid. Thomson's point is that the law does not generally require the giving of aid
(p. 16). When it does, it merely requires that the actor be a Minimally
Decent Samaritan (p. 16). It does not require anyone, other than a
pregnant woman, to be a Good Samaritan.60
Professor Donald Regan, relying on Thomson's basic argument
about the Good Samaritan, has developed a strong equal protection
argument in favor of abortion rights.61 He argues in part:
To see the equalprotectionproblem,we must look at abortionin a
broadercontext. Life in societyproducesmanysituationsin whichone
individualis in a positionto give neededaid to anotherindividual.That
is to say, life in society offersmany opportunitiesto be a good or bad
samaritan.The objectionto an anti-abortionstatuteis that it picks out
certainpotentialsamaritans,namely women who want abortions,and
treatsthem in a way that is at odds with the law's treatmentof other
potentialsamaritans.Womenwho want abortionsare requiredto give
aid in circumstanceswhere closely analogouspotentialsamaritansare
not. And they are requiredto give aid of a kind and an extentthat is
requiredof no other potentialsamaritan.62
Given the problems created by Roe v. Wade's reliance on the right
to privacy,63recent feminist writing has stressed the need for an equal
protection approach to abortion.64 The equal protection approach is
especially important when one considers the plight of poor women
59. The National Abortion Rights Action League submitted an amicus brief in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), which contained thirty-eight real
stories of abortion experiences told by women. See Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1574, 1635-37 (1987).
60. In 1971, when Thomson wrote this essay, all fifty states had laws prohibiting abortion by
choice, thereby requiring pregnant women to be Good Samaritans. P. 16.
61. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979).
62. Id. at 1622 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
63. For example, privacy arguments make abortion a matter of private choice, which is of
little value to poor women who cannot afford the choice. Also, privacy arguments focus on the
individual woman rather than on the collective needs of women.
64. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, supra note 56, at 93-102; R. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND
WOMAN'S CHOICE295-302 (1984); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955 (1984).
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who have no meaningful access to abortion. Thomson's essay provides a valuable first step in pursuit of this approach.
C. Privacy and Rights
"The personal is political." This simple feminist slogan has been
assigned many meanings. The most constant theme underlying the
slogan's various explanations is an attack on the distinction between
public and private. The personal, previously private and protected
from government interference, should be politicized, made public. In
accord with this theme, some feminists argue that strong support for a
right to privacy is harmful to women.65 Other feminists argue that
privacy is an important interest, that the sex/gender system has prevented women from getting their fair share of privacy, and that feminist theory ought to focus on women's right to privacy.66 Whichever
way you cut it, privacy is an important topic for feminist theory.
Thomson's essay on privacy, The Right to Privacy (p. 117), was
originally published in 1975. As with the abortion essay, it has been
around long enough to engender numerous critiques.67 Thomson's
working hypothesis is that there is no separate right to privacy, but
that instead the interests protected by privacy are all protected by
other primary rights. For example, the right not to be listened to and
the right not to be looked at, although part of the cluster of privacy
rights, are derived from the more primary rights we have over our own
persons (p. 126). Similarly, the right that our property not be looked
at is derived from our more basic property rights (p. 124). In Thomson's view, the right to privacy is derivative in the following sense:
[I]t is possibleto explainin the case of each right in the [privacy]
clusterhow come we have it withoutever once mentioningthe rightto
privacy. Indeedthe wrongnessof everyviolationof the rightto privacy
can be explainedwithoutever once mentioningit. [p. 133]
Whether or not this is true in every case, it is certainly an interesting claim. And of course, it is true for every case that Thomson posits.
A man's right that you not look at his pornographicpicture is derived
from his property rights in the picture (pp. 120-24). An opera singer's
right that you not listen to her sing (in private) is derived from her
rights over her person (pp. 125-26). Torturing a man to get personal
information is a violation of his "right to not be hurt or harmed" (p.
129). As Thomson puts it, these people (the man with the porno65. For example, Professor MacKinnon says: "This right to privacy is a right of men 'to be
let alone' to oppress women one at a time. It embodies and reflects the private sphere's existing
definition of womanhood." C. MACKINNON,
supra note 56, at 102 (footnote omitted).
66. See Allen, Women and Their Privacy: What Is at Stake?, in BEYONDDOMINATION:
NEW PERSPECTIVESON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY233 (C. Gould ed. 1984).
67. See, e.g., Gavison, Privacyand the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Reiman,

Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL.& PUB. AFF. 26 (1976); Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL.& PUB. AFF. 314 (1975).
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graphic picture, the opera singer, the tortured man) have their respective rights (that the picture not be looked at, that the voice not be
listened to, that the body not be tortured), but not because they have a
right to privacy. Instead, they have these respective rights as primary
rights, and it is because they have these primary rights that we say
they have a right to privacy (p. 133).
Thomson puts these thoughts forward as a tentative suggestion.
She believes that thinking about the right to privacy in this way may
help us to understandthe nature of rights. If every time we say, "Aha,
there is a violation of the right to privacy," we then push further to see
if there is really some more basic underlying right, then perhaps we
will remove some of the darkness that surrounds our understandingof
rights.
I agree with Thomson that pushing beneath the surface of every
privacy hypothetical is a useful heuristic device. I think it especially
useful to focus on hypotheticals that involve women, something that
Thomson does too infrequently. Consider the right not to be looked at
and not to be touched. These are rights that might be waived once a
person walks into a crowd. Suppose that someone looks at your left
knee because you absent-mindedly left it uncovered (pp. 124-25).
Thomson suggests that in such a situation you might have waived
your right to have your knee not looked at. But what if you are a
woman and it is your left breast, not uncovered at all, and the look is
not merely a look but a leer? And what if someone in a crowd touches
your left breast, not accidentally. It is all well and good to describe
these invasions as invasions of your rights over your person, or even
over your body, but it does strike me that there are parts of your person and of your body that are more private than others. Once we
begin to make these sort of distinctions, between knees and breasts, for
example, then I think we will begin to approach a deeper understanding of privacy.
Thomson's observation (that privacy rights are derivative because
everything that they protect can be described without ever once mentioning privacy) tells us two differentsorts of things, one about privacy
and one about rights. What it tells us about privacy is linguistic. We
talk less about the truly private parts of our lives, such as our most
intimate sense of self, than we do about the public parts. It is easier to
talk with others about the external, objective parts of ourselves, the
parts that others see. Therefore, it should not be so surprisingthat we
are able to describe large parts of "privacy" by using more public
terms.
Thomson's observation also suggests to us something about rights.
What it suggests is this: In the realm of the truly private, where there
is only "me," it is meaningless to talk of rights. Let me put it more
concretely. Imagine Robinson Crusoe on his island without his man,
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Friday. Imagine that there are no other persons in existence. What
would it mean to say that Robinson Crusoe has a right? A right to
life, a right to property, a right over his person?
Rights, it seems to me, are dependent upon the existence of at least
two persons. Rights, it seems to me, are moral descriptions of relationships. They say something about the way we think that relationships between persons ought to be. Thomson, although she does not
say it in so many words, recognizes this when she says in the
afterword, ". .. it seems ... that to have a right just is its being the
case that people may and may not treat you in these and those ways"
(p. 253).
Thomson's moral theory is quite clearly based on a concept of
rights. Nowhere does she explicitly focus on the importance of relationships,68a theme that has emerged in recent feminist writing about
morality and law.69 And yet the contingency that she is willing to
assign to rights emphasizes the importance of context, including the
importance of the relationships posited by the context.
Take the right to life. Again and again, Thomson emphasizes that
it is not absolute, that it is contingent. It is not sufficientlyabsolute in
the case of the fetus or the famous violinist to force involuntary servitude upon others.70 Nor is it sufficiently absolute to insulate Aggressor from Victim.71
The contingency of the right to life is pressed most thoroughly in
her two essays on the Trolley Problem.72 The trolley driver, you will
recall, cannot stop his runaway trolley. He is thus faced with the
choice of either killing the five workers in front of him or turning the
trolley, in which case he will kill only one. Thomson concludes that
he may save five lives by killing the one. And in the event that the
trolley driver is incapacitated, Thomson similarly concludes that a bystander at the switch may turn the trolley toward the one in order to
save the five. Thomson says that the one has a right to life, but not a
right that the bystander at the switch not turn the trolley.
Thomson wants to focus primarily on the means by which the five
are saved and the one is killed. The means is the turning of the trolley.
But as she soon makes clear in subsequent hypotheticals, sometimes
the means (turning the trolley) infringes no right and sometimes the
same means (turning the trolley) does infringe a right. It all depends.
68. She does, however, note the unique situation of the mother and fetus as constituting a
relationship upon which one might argue for unique duties of the mother. P. 11.
69. See, e.g., C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N. NODDINGS, CARING: A
FEMININEAPPROACH
TOETHICSANDMORALEDUCATION
(1984); Sherry, Civic Virtueand the
Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
70. See Thomson's essay, A Defense of Abortion. Pp. 1-19.
71. See Thomson's essay, Self-Defense and Rights. Pp. 33-48.
72. See section II.C supra.
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And what it seems to depend on, although Thomson does not say this
explicitly, is the relationship between the bystander and the one.
Consider one of Thomson's variants on the "bystander at the
switch" hypothetical:
The five on the straight track are regular track workmen. The righthand track is a dead end, unused in ten years. The Mayor, representing
the City, has set out picnic tables on it, and invited the convalescents at
the nearby City Hospital to have their meals there, guaranteeing them
that no trolleys will ever, for any reason, be turned onto that track. The
one on the right hand track is a convalescent having his lunch there; it
would never have occurred to him to do so if the Mayor had not issued
his invitation and guarantee. The Mayor was out for a walk; he now
stands by the switch. [pp. 111-12]

Is it morally permissible for the Mayor to turn the trolley on the
one? Thomson's feeling is that it is not, because the one has a right
against the Mayor generated by the promise. Others conclude that he
may. Thomson speculates that they "think the right less stringent
than I do" (p. 112). My guess is that, instead, they are focusing on the
more abstract right of the one, the "right to not be killed," rather than
on the relationship which generated the additional promissory right.
My colleague, Professor Douglas Laycock, for example, is one of
those who thinks the Mayor may turn the trolley. Laycock explains
that the Mayor may proceed because, if it is morally permissible to
take the life of the one in order to save the five, then surely it is permissible to break a promise to the one in order to save the five.73
Laycock's explanation separates the abstract "right to not be killed"
from the factual context in which it arises and presumes that the right
of the one is the same regardless of who stands by the switch. This
explanation is satisfactory if you adopt a Kantian model of impartiality in which all the persons on the track exert "equal pull" on the
bystander at the switch. It is not satisfactory if you believe that personal relationships are sometimes relevant to moral choices. A feminist explanation of Thomson's intuitive response to the "Mayor at the
switch" hypothetical would focus on the relationship between the
Mayor and the one.74 It would not focus on an abstract right.
Critical legal theorists have attacked rights theorists so often that
the attack hardly bears repeating here. Rights are indeterminate and
theories based on rights do not account for this indeterminacy.75
Feminist legal theorists have joined the attack, pointing out that rights
analysis focuses too much on the individual and begins with individual
73. Laycock, supra note 39, at 411.
74. See, e.g., Baier, Hume, the Women'sMoral Theorist?in WOMENAND MORALTHEORY
37 (E. Kittay & D. Meyers eds. 1987). Baier argues that Hume's moral theory, unlike Kant's,
centers on the cultivation of good character traits, the most important ones being those concerning relations with others.
75. See Symposium: A Critiqueof Rights, 62 TEXASL. REV. 1363 (1984).
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male values as the norm.76 As she moves from essay to essay, probing
the underpinnings of each right she seeks to understand, Thomson
adds support for the critical claim that rights are indeterminate. Her
conclusion, however, is not that there can be no coherent theory of
rights. Instead, she concludes that the theory must be one that contemplates the moral infringement of rights (p. 255). Thus, in Thomson's view, rights are not absolute, they may be infringed, and they tell
us something about how people may treat each other. At the same
time, they have moral force and, if infringed, the infringement leaves
moral traces. It is clear to me from reading Thomson that she would
place herself in what feminists describe as the justice tradition, associated with Mill, Kant, and Rawls.77 And yet the more I read her stories and see her willingness to admit the contingency of rights, the
more I wonder if it would not be more appropriateto place her in the
Aristotelian tradition in which "moral deliberation must determine
the right thing to do, at the right time, in the right place, to the right
person, in the right way."78 I cannot help but wonder why it is that
she stays focused on the question of rights, rather than looking at the
relationships that are present in the stories that she tells.
I do not mean to argue for relationships over rights as a means for
solving moral dilemmas. I merely mean to suggest that focusing on
rights, to the exclusion of relationships, is not particularly helpful.
Thomson's hypotheticals explicitly raise questions about the meaning
of rights. (What does it mean for the one worker to have a right to life
in the TrolleyProblem?) Although Thomson fails to focus on the relationships created in her hypotheticals, they are always there, behind
the scenes.
The importance of these relationships is implicit, even in Thomson's own search for moral explanations. Consider the case of the surgeon who is faced with the choice of operating on one healthy patient
to remove his organs in order to save the lives of five unhealthy patients. All agree that the surgeon may not proceed. But why not?
Moral theory, says Thomson, must adequately explain the why not (p.
258). The utilitarian, she suggests might explain the moral rule to be
applied to the surgeon by looking to the consequences. Ultimately,
utility would not be served in a world in which surgeons were allowed
to sacrifice their healthy patients for their unhealthy ones. And yet
Thomson does not find this explanation satisfactory. As she puts it:
76. See Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEXAS L. REV.
387, 400 (1984). At the same time, an appeal to rights has often been successful in improving the
status of women. Thus, feminist litigators have a perspective on the use of rights that is more
positive than the perspective of the abstract theorist. See Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women'sMovement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
77. See WOMENANDMORALTHEORY,
supra
supra note 74, at 4; see generally C. GILLIGAN,
note 69.
78. WOMENAND MORALTHEORY,supra note 74, at 8.
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[It] locatesthe moralsourceof the prohibition... in the wrongplace.
Surelythe reasonwhy the surgeonmust not proceedhas to lie, not in
what proceedingwould cause other people,but in what proceedinginvolves doing to the young man. The unhappinesswhich would be
causedothersby the surgeon'sproceedingseems to be utterlyinsignificant by comparisonwith, and thus not adequatelyexplanatoryof, the
enormityof the wrongwhich the surgeonwouldbe doing to the young
man himself. [pp. 259-260]
Thomson attempts to locate the source of the moral prohibition in
the young man himself. Her intuition is that the young man must
have some sort of right. And yet her discussion focuses not on the
young man, but on the surgeon and the young man together. To shift
the focus from the young man individually to the relationship between
the two may not solve the moral dilemma, but, for me at least, it adds
explanatory power that is more satisfying.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Rights, Restitution, & Risk, Judith Jarvis Thomson attempts to
demonstrate the validity of general ethical principles by testing them
against specific hypothetical cases. Her aim is to build moral theory
that can explain specific data, predict future data, and do so with morally satisfactory explanations. Her process is to use examples that are
concrete and that pose significant moral dilemmas. Bernard Williams
says of Thomson's examples: "They are starkly presented, and notably
unsentimental" (book cover).
We, as law teachers, attempt to demonstrate the right or wrong
outcome in a particular case by applying similar general principles.
Our point is to help our students build an understandingof legal theory. There is a striking, and at times dangerous, similarity between
the way in which we teach law and the way in which Professor Thomson teaches moral philosophy.
Too often we, as law teachers, teach from case books in which the
editors, concerned with the legal rule of the case, have edited out the
factual richness. Too often we teach a case as though it were an abstract hypothetical, disconnected from the circumstances in which it
in fact arose. And when we create our own hypotheticals, we often
talk of abstract plaintiffs and defendants, of gender-neutralA's and
B's.
Thomson's hypotheticals and our edited cases, pared of their full
facts, are valuable teaching tools. A good teacher can use the starkness of such stories to capture a student's attention. But when such
stories are stripped of real human context, our intuitive reactions to
them may be distorted. Therefore, when we are building moral and
legal theory in the classroom, we must be sensitive to this risk. When
stories are used as foundations for theory, perhaps they should be told
in full.

